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INTRODUCTION. 
Forms and systems of government have ever been an impor- 
tant factor in promoting the welfare of the subjects or citizens. In 
early days under good rulers, and in later times under favorable sys- 
tems, the development of the masses has been marled, while under less 
favorable governments, progrees has been retarded. But as the people 
have advanced in civilization the systems of government have necessar- 
ily changed to meet the new conditions. Each system as it has proved 
successful for its age gave promise of being an ideal form, but in time 
it also proved inadequate to the demands and was replaced by another. 
After twenty five centuries since first the free -men of 
Greece established popular self government, this general system has 
come to be recognized by all the civilized world as the only right and 
tenable form: and while most of the governments still preserve much of 
the pomp and show that is the essence of royalty, each of the nations 
of the earth that is worthy the name hasggiven the people a large and 
increasing, or else entire control of political affairs. This fact 
realized, the only question now at issue by the students of political 
science is one of practicability --how best and surest, and possibly 
quickest, to secure the sober judgment of those who are recognized as 
competent to participate in the affairs of state. 
The varying requirements because of the moods and temper- 
aments of the different races have made it impossible that any one type 
is equally well adapted to all, but as each nation progresses in the 
science of government it is plain to be seen that the development is 
along two distinct lines. One system is indirect as regards the peo- 
ple, and is rather a government of the few, acting according to their 
mn judgment, but by virtue of delegated powers. This is the theory 
leveloped by the founders of the Presidential system of the United 
;tates. While in some practices, as in the method of election of the 
'resident, we have made a partial departure from the theory, our gov- 
;rnment is the best example of the system. The other is more demo- 
:ratic in form, and seeks to secure the direct and exact judgment of 
,hose who have been admitted to the electorate, and to make that judg- 
ent binding upon the lawmaking and administrative bodies. The English 
,arlimentary system, independent of the King and the House of Lords,is 
.he most notable example. 
As many changes are being wrought in our own government, 
and many more are constantly proposed, it is important for us to study 
;he two methods to determine which one is more nearly the ideal, to 
;he end that whatever changes may be necessary in our system shall be 
towards this ideal and in harmony with it rather than away from it. 
eor the present, then, let us suspend our commonly accepted ideas 
;hat this country has the best form of government so far devised, and 
Ls if we were visitors from another world, take up the theory and 
actual experience of the two schools and see if one is not better 
adapted for a rely free people than the other. 
Making our definitions to start with: an ideal government 
'or a free people is that form which responds most easily in the enact - 
lent and administering of laws to the judgment of that people. 
A free people are those, not only unrestrained by any 
mperior force, but who also are really competent to manage their own 
affairs. For those people not yet entirely competent to have their 
rill enacted into law, the Presidential system may be better adapted, 
)r the Cabinet system must be modified to be applicable to the special 
:onditions. 
The Cabinet system is a conduct of government or adminis- 
tration by a committee of the legislature, who formulate the desired 
laws, steer them through that body, and administer them after enact- 
ment. The striking feature of this system is the absolute accounta- 
bility of the cabinet to their creators, and the consequent uncertain- 
ty of the tenure of office. The result is necessarily harmony between 
the legislative and executive branches, or else resignation or dis- 
solution, and a readjustment that will be harmonious. 
The Presidential system is an administration of laws by 
an executive, advised by a cabinet of his own choosing, suggesting new 
laws but hardly daring to insist on them, wholly independent of the 
legislative branch except for criminal offence, elected by the people, 
and serving for a fixed period. The striking feature is the lack of 
direct responsibility to any power except his own conscience, and per- 
haps a fear that he must not depart from the path that the public has 
marked. The result is a continual jealousy between the two branches 
and often friction that retards legislation until after the next gen- 
eral election. 
These two systems may be illustrated by two forms of busi 
ness organizations with which all are familliar--the joint stock com- 
pany and the regular private corporation. The former, like the Pres- 
idential system, has the board of directors(corresponding to the leg- 
islature) elected by the stockholders(corresponding to the citizen - 
voters), and also the officers(executive)elected by the same voters. 
Like the Presidential system, each branch is independent of the other, 
looks to the same source (the membership) for authority, and in quese,. 
tions of policy subject to difference of opinion, and liable to prove 
an effectual check upon each other. The latter has the board of di- 
rectors elected by the members, and these directors now have entire 
Charge of the business of the company. They elect and discharge the 
officers at will. The executive is thus bound to do the will of the 
master 
--the board --and the only recourse in case of difference is to 
appeal the question direct to the membership. 
In some reppects this illustration may seem inapt, but it 
clear enough to present the two systems at a glance, even though it 
would be unjust to judge of governments by the results of the same 
systems as applied to business. It is significant to add however, tha 
almost without exception, the joint stock company is recognized as .a 
business failure. In contrast with this, the private corporation is 
the marvel of this age of wonders. It has made all our modern commer- 
ial life a possibility. It can do the things that no one person can 
reasonably expect to do, because it combines the wisdom of many; and 
on the other hand, it has the executive ability of the most capable 
individual that money can command. It is no argument against the sys- 
tem to show that the corporation by heartless and illegal acts is a 
menace to our public institutions. Rather this very capacity is a 
powerful argument for its efficiency; and if these copporations, the 
creatures of the state, should ultimately prove stronger than the stat 
as at present constituted, then logically, the most effective method 
of control should be to inaugerate the sane system in affairs of state 
ADVANTAGES. I RESPONSIVNESS. 
Taking up now the main thought, which is to examine the 
Cabinet system in detail, this can best be done by making compprison 
at each successive step with the other system with which we are al- 
ready familliar. 
An examination of the theoretical workings of the system 
will at once show its simplicity and responsivness to the will of the 
electorate. The elections are held at no fixed time. When there 
t. 
is a difference of opinion between the lawmakers and the executive on 
some vital question, the executive is forced to do one of two things. 
It may resign and let the legislature select a new cabinet, or else it 
may disolve the legislature and appeal to the country. This latter 
course is for the purpose of securing the expression of the voters on 
the issue before them. There is no excuse at this election to intro- 
duce outside issues. Fach candidate favors or disapproves the proposed 
measure. The election over, the majority. of the new house have the du- 
ty of -enacting the proposed law. They select the cabinet from their awn 
number with instructions to do certain things. The cabinet must frame 
the proposed measure to make it accord with constitutional rights and 
precedents. They present it to the house, and are there to defend it 
and to aid its passage. If there is a division of opinion amongnthe 
maljority on some minor point, then a caucus must be 
get together, or else run the risk of the minority party siding in 
with one faction. Finally, after the law is passed, the enforcement 
rests with its friends, the authors. If it has not a fair trial, its 
supporters are to blame. 
In actual practice this theory may fail. Third parties 
may break into the legislature, and with a special cause to promote, 
effect a coalition with the minority. Again the party in power may 
choose the time most opportune for securing the verdict of the country 
in their 
in their favor, at which to disolve the legislature and secure a new 
election, or they may force an issue our of some minor question in 
order to get a new lease of power: but any or all of these points 
which may be advanced, only postponesthe contest on the real issue 
until such time as the country really wants it settled. 
Contrasted with this simple and responsive system is the 
indirect one with which we are acquainted in the United States. The 
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origional theory of the founders that men and not issues should decide 
he election, and that the men elected should use their own judgment 
n the enactment of lwas, has been modified by practice until we try 
Ito elect on the issues. But the result is much the same as was intend- 
-d. The elections come at stated intervals whether there is any partin- 
lar issue at stake or not. The two main parties do not divide on any 
ne question but on many, though one may be paramount to the others. 
he voters must therefore choose between parties rather than particu- 
lar issues --endorsing many questions which they dislike in order to 
express themselves on others. No platform of a dozen planks can meet 
the entire approval of even a single thinking voter. Then there are 
local conditions continually arising to affect the action on the great- 




expressed an impartial judgment on any national question, be - 
of the fear of negro domination in their own states. Then parts 
personal feelings, district improvmmetts, and other local issues 
all have an influence in blinding men to the great questions. 
Supposing though, as is generally the case, that after 
years of agitation, that part of Congress, the House of Representatives 
right from the people is generally agreed on some measure of public 
sanction, it is but the beginning of the legislative struggle. The 
Senate, unlike the House of Lords in England, does not sit principally 
as a matter of form and soon pass any important measure that is sent 
up to them, but seeks to decide the question for itself, in its own 
way, and in its own time. In theory representing the states, but in 
practice representing nothing but their own convictions (unless the 
commonly accepted opinion, that they represent certain influences 
called "the interests', is trued the are neverthelsssan effective 
check upon legislation. But the existance of this body is not necess- 
arily an essential to the pystem and should not be charged up to it, 
unless it be held as a third party to decide between two otherwise 
incompatable branches 
--the executive and the House. But the President 
elected by the same constituency as that of the House, but often at a 
different time, and exercising a veto power, without being responsible 
to any one, makes the radical difference, as explained in the ddfini- 
tion, from the other system. If this one man feels bound to a party 
that has since been driven from the House, of if he considers his 
judgment of more weight than that of the country, then he is there to 
veto adverse legislation, or hinder its enforcement, if enacted. All 
this may be desirable in this country, but it is certainly contrary to 
the theory that the will of the people should be the law of the land. 
II STABILITY. 
A second general advantage of the CF.,binet system is the 
stability of government which it promotes. The most general serious 
menace to modern governments is due to corruption of the public offi- 
cers. This practice has made our American cities the most notorious 
if not actually the worst governed of any in the world. Corruption 
caused the conditions that brought on the Russian--Japanesse war, and 
brought defeat to the Russians and disrepute and ultimately, overthrow, 
to the Aristocracy. No government has entirely escaped is cancerous 
growth, and very many have succumbed to it. Any system that tends to 
sheiadits practice is so far unstable, for violent means will be used 
if necessary to root it out, while any system that minimizes the dan- 
ger is that much more certain of continued life --as certain as disease 
will send a man to an early grave or preservation of health will tend 
to longevity. 
What opportunities then do these two systems offer to 
those V mmercial interests which are continually at work to conduct 
nefarious practices2 
he +A 1,.p,.. 
o far as the legislature is concerned, any form 
of remuneration for questionable practice would be unprofitable for 
the corruptionists, providing the purchased legislation was liable to 
an immediate repeal. We can hardly conceive of city councils voting 
away valuable franchises in the face of public sentiment, when that 
very act might mean the dissolution of their body and the holding of 
a new election. In the case of bribery of officials, this would hardly 
seem possible when each held office at the will of the legislature 
and was liable to discharge with scarcely a hearing in his own defence. 
Whatever may be said of the corruptors of our public life, they are no 
fools. And it is safe to assume that the incentive to purchase favors 
will suddenly fail when it is demonstated that those who are paid the 
price cannot deliver the goods. How far this theory holds good in 
actual practice for difference of opinion to 
settle satisfactorily, but according to our own experience in business 
life and the undisputed improvement in England as thgleabinet system 
is more fully developed, we affirm that the responsibility to particu 
lar and certain parties will tend to discourage corruption among public 
servants. 
III AL7RT '-UrCTORATr. 
The tendency of the cabinet system to react upon and 
develope the character of the electorate is one of its most commend- 
able points. People like officers are sobered by responsibility. As 
long as they may secure change or reform in goverhment by legal or 
peaceful means, there is no excuse for mob violence. Then when they 
actually have the power to do things, they will stop to consider the 
consequennee before carrying out the threats previously made. On no 
other hyphothsis can be explained the extreme conservatism of the 
English people, and the radical actions of the French during the days 
of the Revolution. 
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To those who have watched the affairs of our cities go 
from bad to worse nothing is more disheartening than to see the indif- 
ference of those who are being despoiled and robbed, and know it, and 
nave the power to remedy matters but do not use it. But a little con- 
sideration will show how monstrous is the task. It takes desperate 
conditions to arouse all the people to act together, and nothing short 
of this will make any difference. The wave of reform sets in with a 
majority vote, but that is not momentum enough to carry it along. Of- 
ficers are unfaithful or else prove incompetent, and there is no rem- 
edy till the next election. The press points out the failure in the 
administration, but what is to be done aboutiit? Nothing at all --till 
the next election. By that time the people have relaxed interest, or 
the party machine is able to get out the vote and the old conditions 
return. Under such circumstances each man feels that it is a waste of 
time to take an interest in public affairs; that he had better attend 
to business and make up in, other ways what he looses by nismanagement 
of public affairs. 7ach one thinks he can stand it if the rest can, 
and if the others will not do anything, why he will let it rest. Only 
when conditions reach such a state that a vital question is inevitably 
projected before the public right on the eve of an election is there 
a reasonable chance for reform. The public feels that it has a chance 
ow and sets about to do things. It is all worth while for they have 
the power. Everybody is interested because he knows everybody else is. 
And the results are seemingly remarkable. Within a year of this writ- 
ing, of our American cities, Philadelphia, New York, Chicago, Milwaukee 
and Newark have passed through this very experience. But the awakening 
is not remarkable. It came according to an inevitable law. Hitherto, 
the forces of corruption had kept the people divided by false issues, 
but bonditions reached such a state that their record could not be 
- 
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suppressed at election time, and the overturn was a possibility. The 
lesson to be gained from this is qbvious. It is not to let things run 
so far that the issue cannot be suppressed at election time, but to 
make it possible to hold an election whenever there is an issue. This 
will have the desired effect upon the character of the public. They 
will be always alive to guard their interests because it is worth while. 
As to actual results, we find that the House of Commons elected for 
seven ye,rs has served its time out but once in a hundred years, and 
has been forced to face a new election on the average almost as often 
at the House of Represenatives in this country= -once in two years, but 
with this difference, that possibility of an election at any time tends 
to keep the electorate awakened at all times. And so we have developed 
because of the cabinet system, an alert constituency. 
IV HARMONIOUS LAWS. 
Another commendable feature possible only in the cabinet 
system, is the harmony of the lwws. At this time there is pending 
before the American Congress the hardest fought battle for a legis- 
lative measure of a generation 
--the railroad rate bill. To show the 
confusion and uncertainty, not an advocate of the measure but has been 
publicly denounced by other advocates as an enemy in disguise. The 
most prevelent charges are that the guilty one who is favoring the 
bill as a whole is supporting some clause that will make the measure 
so radical it cannot pass, or else will cause it to be declared uncon- 
stitutional by the courts; or else will emasculate it will amendments. 
As a matter of fact, no one is responsible for the bill in its present 
form, and no one would care to be known as the atthor. The enemies 
of effective legislation may be opposing this measure for a blind in 
order to keep the supporters from passing more sttingent laws, while 
the President and the friends of railroad regulation seem to feel that 
this law, at best is but a step, and that futthur legislation must soon 
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follow. How different the experience of England, where the greatest 
expetts of the country,acting under instructions of the cabinet, frame 
and word the proposed law so that there can be but little chance for 
misconstruction by the courtt9 and where such a thing as a "joker" is 
impossible; and where after all the only question that the courts have 
to decide is what the authors of the law intended. 
V. SUET CONTROL. 
A fifth point 
--the strict control of the bugget--is ad- 
vanced by the advocates of the cabinet system, though perhaps this is 
not necessarily anEeature exclusive to this. The financial secretary 
must approve the particular items of every appropiation bill, which 
serves as an effectual check upon the practice that permits each mem- 
ber with a pull to secure an interest in the public funds. The minis- 
try being thus responsible for the appropiation of money, are naturally 
more careful than they otherwise would be, and the opponents are quick 
to seize any opportunity to create an issue. It might be in place to 
add right here, that the same result would probably be accomplished 
under the other system, by giving the executive power to veto partic- 
ular items in any bill carrying appropiations. 
EXPERIENCE CF NATIONS. 
After this extended discussion in favor od the theory 
of cabinet government it may be well to refer briefly to the experi- 
ence of those nations which have given it a trial. Japan, in reorgan- 
izing her government some twenty years ago, with the thought of giving 
the people a large measure of power, sent a commission abroad to in- 
vestigate and report on the different systems. The one finally adopted 
is almost identical with that of England. The remarkable success of 
this nation in the late war is largely attributed to the centralized 
yet representative power which her administration exercised. 
As furnishing the fairest test under similar conditions, 
the people of Spain and those of the South American republics are of 
the same nationality, and still hold to the same religeon andxionothec 
usiness methods. The republics, with the Presidential system, are no- 
oriously unstable. Not a nation but has had a series of revolutions 
r rebellions; not a month: abut an armed struggle is on in some one of 
the countries. In Spain, the government by the cabinet is able to 
eather all storms. The nation recovered from the disasters of the 
American war without even a change of ministry. Since then the country 
has made rapid strides in internal development, and now her government 
has the entire confidence of the financial centers of the world. 
In the plans for the new form of government in Russia, 
the cabinet system is the only one to have received serious consider- 
ation, and is now on trial. So far it has had but little chance, and 
the struggle may yet be between the supporters of the old order and 
the advocates of socalistic republic, but neither can permanently suc- 
ceed, and it is only a question of time till the cabinet system must 
be adopted for the needs of that unfortunate half -free people. 
The experiance of France seems peculiarly adapted to show 
the actual workings of the two systems. Two former republics were 
patterned after the American plan --the executive having considerable 
power independent of the legislative. In the First Republic, the com- 
mittee of five, and in the Second Pepublic,.Louis Napoleon, were able 
to usurp all the power, and change the form of government. This was 
perhaps possible because of the temperament of the people-erratic, 
hot-headed, passionate, -and flighty of thought and action. But how 
about the Third Republic? This has been formed with all power vested 
in the legislature and cabinet, and the President more of an ornament 
than any conspicuous use. For thirty years, policies of administratio 
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have changed from one thing to another, parties have rose and fell, 
cabinets are made and unmade in a night, enemies of the Republic pro- 
claim their sentiments from the housetops and vote their ticket at the 
elections, but the government is growing stronger and more stable with 
each passing year. 
But these instances only show that the cabinet system is 
suited to the needs of people not yet entirely competent to manage 
their own affairs, and who must be dependent upon a strong central 
government partly controlled by the surerior class. But if it is the 
ideal form for leading people out of darkness and teaching them to be. 
self 
-dependent, it is no less satisfactory when adapted to the people 
who claim the entire control of their political affairs. 
Thus it has remained for England to develop the system to 
the fullest extent thus far attained. The Anglo-Saxon has for centuries 
been the prime mover in the establishment of representative government. 
The English parliment has been the scene of many fierce battles for 
popular rule long before the time of the American revolution. The in- 
dependence of America and the establishment of the republic was possi- 
ble because its founders were of the race that had stood for free gov- 
ernment, and also because the subjects of King George III were only 
half-heartedly supporters of the temporary policy of oppression to 
which his ministry was committed.. But it was not till after the Napol- 
eonic wars that the system was able to show what was possible, and 
since that time the advancement of England at home and in commercial 
expansion and in colonization of remote countries has been a wonderful 
story. While the cabinet had long represented the governing body of 
England, it was not till 1832 that the suffrage included the grerA mid- 
dle class, and as late as 1887 before the great body of citizens were 
admitted to the electorate. Until this last date, the English system 
n 
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s more of an example of efficiency in administration and progress in 
efinite reforms: since then it shows the same efficiency under a pure 
emocrEqic government. In these years her tariff policy has been con- 
istant and fair to her own subjects and to her colonists. Most of the 
olonies have enjoyed complete self governmert,modeled after that of 
he mother country, saving the expense of a navy and without paying 
axes to the home country. "er civil service law permits of a change 
f less than fifty officers of government when there is a change of 
administration. All the rest serve as long as performing efficient 
service. There seems to be little of public scandal connected with 
its administration of the army or the colonies. During the past year 
it has passed through a crises in government, due to a complete change 
in public sentiment, and while there may be many radical laws enacted, 
there is not a sign of a commercial panic, that invariably follows 
such a change in this country. In spite of the opposition of the power- 
ful land owners, the government has provided for the condemnation of 
the large estates in Ireland, and the sale to the landless class. It 
has inaugerated vast public enterprises in India and Tgypt for the 
1ettermert of conditions there. And Finally, as evidence of stability, 
nd showing how well the masses are suited with the form, there is no 
gitation by that class who claim to be the foes of all government-- 
he anarchists. In proportion as a government represents the people, 
the work of this crowd is fruitless. Then there is the Canadian gov- 
ernment right on our side, that has the cabinet system in complete 
orking order, end it will be the most fruitful field for study of any. 
CONCLUSION. 
At the close of this paper we would feel that our efforts 
ere fruitless did it not suggest some direct benifit that may come to 
cur own country. We do not imagine that the cabinet system should re - 
lace our present form, even if the public were favorable to it. How- 
ever, as stated at the beginning, we are constantly making changes in 
our system, and if we have in mind an ideal, then the changes will be 
more easily made, and will more likely give better results, if in har- 
mony with that ideal. In a general way then, we conclude that the 
legislature should be made more representative of the judgment of the 
public, and that the jealousy between the legislative and executive 
branches can 
attain these 
we now face, 
the ideal. 
be gradually adjusted in favor of the legislative. To 
ends, let us outline some of the specific problems which 
and suggest a solution that seems to be in harmon j with 
The most important one just at present is a change of 
method of election of the United States senators 
--making them repre- 
sent some tangible and definite constituency, rather than a state leg- 
islature that has adjourned before their own terms is hardly begun. 
The primary system for the nomination of candidates, seems 
to aid in securing popular favorites for office, rather than men who 
can best manipulate caucuses, and should have a thorough trial. 
Some adequate means for retiring public servants when for 
any reason they are no longer i- sympathy with the popular demands, 
would solve a lot of secondary problems. Even though the means should 
never be used, the possibility would make the servants more careful 
of theft conduct. Los Angelus and some other cities have some such a 
system on trial, and it should be watched with interest. 
A direct vote of the populace upon the laws of the state 
or nation is impracticable, but if important issues are at stake, andrio 
adequate method is at hand for securing a legislature elected or this 
issue, the people of right should have a direct vote. This would be 
especially applicable to cities having the granting of franchises or 
other favors. 
The taxation laws, to be fair, should tax a man on the 
value of the property whichthe government protects, or at least on, his 
ability to pay, rather than on the size of his family; or what amounts 
to the same thing almost, the consumtive capacity of his family. This 
the tariff tax, by one cn incomes, or 
on land or other property values. Eut it would take a broad construct- 
ion, or a change of the constitution to do this. 
But it is tin the matter of our city governments, that the 
theory of centralized responsive government is open to a fair and im- 
partial trial. The failure of the present system, patterned after our 
national systemlhas been so marked, that people everywhere are looking 
for a change. In its hour of extremdly following the flood disaster, 
Galveston adopted what was called a commission system, combining in 
five elected officers, the functions of legislative and executive. 
success other cities to try the plan, and it 
promises to cause a revolution in our city governments. An exaination 
will show that it is practically the same as the cabinet system, ex- 
cept that there is no proviXsion for a dissolution of the body and the 
calling for a new election. But for efficiency of administration, and 
responsibility for use of power, it should be especially satisfactory. 
And it is from the experience in city government that the people of 
the whole pountry will be enabled to profit, and in the course of years 
to build a betters stronger, and more representative government, than 
any of which the world has yet dreamed. 
ould mean the replacement of 
Des Moines, Iowa. 
June 12, 1906. 
